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A conveyance made with intent to defraud creditors to one having notice is voidable by the creditors. *STAT. 13 ELIZ. c. 5.* The fact that the debtor joins with a solvent person in making the conveyance does not render it immune from attack. *Campbell v. Davis*, 85 Ala. 56, 4 So. 140. But though voidable by creditors, the conveyance is otherwise valid. So it has been held that the grantee is entitled to any surplus remaining after the satisfaction of the claims of the creditors. *Burich v. Elliott*, 3 Ind. 99; *Allen v. Trustees of Ashley School Fund*, 102 Mass. 262. And a conveyance by co-tenants has been held voidable only as to the share of the co-tenant whose creditors it was intended to defeat. *Campbell v. Davis, supra.* In England a partnership is not recognized by the law as an entity distinct from the members composing it; the partners are, collectively, the firm. See *POLLOCK, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP*, 6 ed., 20-21. In the principal case, then, the conveyance should be treated as voidable except in so far as it conveyed the interest of the non-bankrupt partner. This interest should remain in the grantee.

HUSBAND AND WIFE — RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AGAINST WIFE AND IN HER PROPERTY — RIGHT OF HUSBAND TO ALIMONY APART FROM DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. — The plaintiff, being indigent and unable to support himself, prayed for a decree requiring his wife, who owned considerable property, to pay him alimony. *Held*, that the decree be granted. *Hagert v. Hagert*, 133 N. W. 1035 (N. D.). See *NOTES*, p. 556.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE — CONTROL BY CONGRESS — EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR DEATH. — A locomotive fireman, while engaged in interstate commerce in New York, was killed through the negligence of the railroad company. His widow, as administratrix, sued the company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and accepted the defendant's offer of judgment. The intestate's father claimed one-half of the amount recovered under the New York Statute of Distribution. *Held*, that he is entitled to it. *Matter of Taylor*, 204 N. Y. 135.

The majority of the court hold that in so far as the federal act attempts to give an action for death to the administratrix it is unconstitutional, on the ground that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce with respect to any particular employee must end with his death. That Congress has the power to regulate the liability of master to servant in interstate commerce can no longer be denied. *Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.*, 32 Sup. Ct. 169. The denial, in the Safety Appliance Act, of the assumption of risk doctrine has been held to apply to an action for death. *Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Bromberg*, 141 Ala. 258, 37 So. 395. There the power of Congress has certainly been effective beyond the death of the employee. If Congress can render the railroad liable at all it must be able to specify to whom. Liability for injuries not causing death, and no liability for fatal ones, would be a singular result. At all events, inasmuch as the original recovery was under the federal statute, the distribution should be under it also. *Matter of Degaramo*, 86 Hun (N. Y.) 390, 33 N. Y. Supp. 502. See *Dennick v. Railroad Co.*, 103 U. S. 11, 20.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE — CONTROL BY CONGRESS — FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT OF 1908. — The Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, provides that "every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce between any of the states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . . ." *Held*, that the statute is constitutional, though it applies to the negligence of employees not engaged in interstate commerce. *Second Employers' Liability Cases*, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169. See *NOTES*, p. 548.